Religious Extremism and
Sectarian Violence:

The Rise of
ISIS

Introduction
How has the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (also
known as IS, ISIS, or ISIL) managed to take over such a
large swath of territory in the Middle East? The answer to
this question is fundamental not only to understanding this
group’s recent sensational success in Iraq and Syria, but also
to identifying strategies to defeat it.
The Islamic State’s success can be attributed in large part
to sectarian violence and oppression in these two states. In
Syria, demonstrations in favor of democratic governance
devolved into a civil war that, in the context of a minority-Shia government ruling a majority-Sunni population,
quickly took on sectarian contours. In Iraq, the Shia-dominated government systematically oppressed the Sunni minority, generating frustration and anger among the latter.
Fundamentally, the Islamic State capitalized on existing
frustrations, sectarian violence, and oppression in these two
states to develop and expand its power in the region.
Islam’s Schism
There are 1.6 billion Muslims in the world today, divided
into two primary sects: Sunni Islam and Shia Islam. Sunni means follower of the sunna, or “way” in Arabic, of the
Prophet Mohammed. Sunnis are opposed to political succession of caliphs based on Mohammed’s bloodline. The
word Shia is a term that stems from shi’atu Ali, Arabic for
“partisans of Ali”. Shias believe that only Mohammed’s descendants should be caliphs because they are part of a divine
order. Sunnism is Islam’s dominant sect, making up 85% of
the world’s Muslim population while the Shia compose the
remaining 15%. Ultimately, Shia identity is rooted in victimhood due to the killing of the Prophet Mohammed’s
grandson, Husayn. Iraq, with a Shia-majority population, is
currently under a Shia-dominated government. The Assad
family, who is Shia, has led Syria even though the majority of the population is Sunni. Over the past several years,
violence between Sunnis and Shias has been increasing in
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these two countries. Shia Muslims usually view Sunnis with
suspicion and extremist Sunnis believe Shias are heretics and
apostates.
Iraq Under Maliki
With the fall of Saddam Hussein’s government in 2003, the
Shia majority (consisting of 60-65% of Iraq’s population of 24
million) began to assert a predominant role in government
after decades of suppression and torture under Hussein’s Sunni rule. In April 2006 Nouri al-Maliki (a Shia) was appointed
prime minister but found it difficult to govern because the
position lacked the power and coherent institutions needed
to rule. Over the next several years, however, his rule became
increasingly authoritarian as he increased his power through
the creation of the “Malikiyoun” (a cohesive group of officials
with close personal ties to Maliki)and the use of Iraq’s security services to protect him personally and politically.
Sunni-majority provinces feared the rise of an autocratic
Shia-led government and under Maliki’s rule, Iraq’s Sunni
minority has been marginalized and sectarian violence has
increased. In December 2011 Maliki exiled Vice President
Tariq al-Hashemi, a Sunni. The government detained and
severely tortured three of his bodyguards until they made
dramatic confessions on national television denouncing the
Vice President for paying them to commit assassinations and
bombings. It was apparent that extreme torture was used to
extract these “confessions” and one of the bodyguards died in
custody. Maliki also arrested the Vice President’s Sunni Deputy Prime Minister, Rafi al-Issawi. Ayad Allawi, head of the
Iraqiya coalition of which al-Hashemi and al-Issawi were senior members, wrote, “The country is slipping back into the
clutches of a dangerous new one-man rule, which inevitably
will lead to full dictatorship.” In February 2011, December
2011 and 2012, and January 2013 Maliki used Iraq Special
Operations Forces to strike down and immobilize political
opposition protest movements. This only resulted in the further fracture of Iraqi society. Maliki’s rule was characterized
by the increasing sectarian polarization as his Shia-dominated government systematically removed Sunni officials from
office and arrested hundreds of Sunnis in response to bombings of Shia neighborhoods.
Syria’s Civil War
The Assad regime has ruled Syria since 1970. The Assad family is Alawite, a heterodox sect of Shia that makes up 13% of
the Syrian population. During the 2011 Arab Spring, Syrians
took to the streets in protest of their government and called
for the institutionalization of democratic ideals rather than
an authoritarian government riddled with corruption. Assad
was determined to crush the demonstrations. When he re-

sponded with force and violent crackdowns, the protestors
gathered with arms. What began as non-violent protests for
a more democratic system of governance turned into a civil
war that has left hundreds of thousands dead, created more
than 3 million Syrian refugees, and left millions more internally displaced.
At the onset, it was thought that extremist groups would
attempt to exploit the conflict, especially groups such as al
Qaeda and their regional franchises. Furthermore, a distinct
divide in affiliation became visible, with Shia groups like
Hezbollah supporting the regime while Sunni Muslims (including al Qaeda) fought with the opposition against the regime. Eastern Syria developed into a sanctuary for extremists
and foreign fighters aligned with al Qaeda. The open border
between Iraq and Syria has allowed jihadists to travel freely
between countries. The al Nusra Front, who was al Qaeda’s
official franchise in Syria, was seen as a legitimate rebel fighter group against the Assad Regime. It was the fastest growing and most effective opposition group due to its relatively
easy access to supplies and resources. There was substantial
support for al Nusra among the Syrian population because
of their ability to provide government services in opposition-held territories. It is important to keep in mind, however, that many fighters in Syria have been fundamentally
Syrian nationalists.

Rise of the Islamic State
The Islamic State had its beginnings as al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI,
an al Qaeda affiliate) and the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). In
2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, became the leader of AQI. Al
Qaeda in Iraq was a group of puritanical Sunni militants
who plagued Iraq with suicide bombings, beheadings, and
kidnappings that targeted both Shia and Sunni Muslims. It
pursued a unified Islamic nation that believed Shias were
apostates who must be fought. AQI’s goals included waging
“jihad in the cause of God in order to exalt his word, liberate all Muslim territories from infidels and apostates [Shias],
and establish sharia law in these territories,” as well as establishing “a wise caliphate similar to the theocracy established
by the Prophet Mohammed.”
In April 2013, al-Baghdadi expanded into Syria, a move very
much in keeping with traditional al Qaeda patterns of moving into conflicts where they claim to support the opposition.
They use their resources to gain new recruits and radicalize
the opposition to create a strong presence within the country. However, the decision also brought him into conflict
with al Qaeda, as entering Syria meant Baghdadi encroached
on al Nusra’s (another al Qaeda affiliate) turf. Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of al Qaeda since the death of bin Laden, ultimately disavowed al-Baghdadi over his refusal to adhere to
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demands he return to Iraq (as well as his divisively brutal
methods). Al-Baghdadi went on to declare that the two al
Qaeda groups would merge under a single name: the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (translated as “the Levant” or
“Greater Syria”), or ISIS.

the mainstream Sunni religious community, including Cairo’s al Azhar seminary, and Yussuf al Qaradawi, an Egyptian
cleric who serves as a spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, represent just a few of the many Muslims who have
denounced the Islamic State.

The Islamic State made significant military and territorial gains despite being disavowed by al Qaeda in February
of 2014. The territory that ISIS carved out of Iraq and Syria allowed them to create a haven for training recruits and
planning attacks. For recruitment, ISIS has drawn from the
pool of foreign fighters already in Syria fighting for jihad.
In June 2014, they captured Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul. The speed with which ISIS has taken territory suggests
that it has been cooperating with Sunnis who were faithful
to Saddam Hussein and who continued to fight against Maliki’s Shia-dominated government. In July 2014, Baghdadideclared himself the caliph of his new Islamic State. The
last Islamic caliphate to exist was dissolved by the modernist reformer Atatürk in 1924 with the founding of the modern Turkish Republic. Much of the Muslim world came to
recognize that the continuation and revival of the caliphate
was not a realistic prospect due to the
shifting world order. They believed the
moral system of Islam could be realized within the confines of the nation
state. The Islamic State, however, does
not believe this. Since its beginnings
as AQI, its goal has been to establish
a caliphate; its main objectives are to
“spread monotheism on earth, cleanse
it of polytheism, to govern according
to the law of God, [and] to repulse the
aggressors.”

Conclusion
President Obama has vowed that the U.S. will “degrade and
ultimately destroy” the Islamic State because it hreatens
American interests in the Middle East, as well as national
security at home. However, in September 2014, President
Obama and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry implied that
local and regional actors would be expected to play an important role in the defeat of ISIS by engaging in ground combat operations while the U.S. focused on providing logistical
support and training for Iraqi forces. Looking ahead, addressing the immediate security and human rights concerns
of the people living under ISIS control is a key objective for
the U.S. and its allies. At the same time, however, identifying
tools, structures, and programs to address the underlying

The violence al-Baghdadi carried out
in Iraq under ISIS has become even
more prevalent under the black banner of the Islamic State. ISIS conducts
savage beheadings and executions of
captured soldiers and men in conquered towns and villages. Christians and Shia Muslims have
been slaughtered and non-Sunni shrines and places of worship destroyed. ISIS views women as second-class citizens
that are to be used for sex and then discarded or sold as slaves
to other men. Young girls are given as brides to men more
than twice their age. Women and girls are forced to undergo
genital mutilation in ISIS-controlled towns.
Because of their brutality and radical interpretation of Islam,
the Islamic State has little support from the Muslim ummah,
or community, in the region. Al Qaeda affiliates in Yemen,
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Free Syrian Army (FSA) soldiers hold a planning
session during the Battle of Aleppo, Oct. 2012
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sources of the Islamic State’s success will be paramount to
ensuring long-term security, stability, and ultimately prosperity. A solution to the challenge of the Islamic State is not
currently evident, and may not even be possible, but that
does not mean the world should not attempt to at least manage the problem of extremist forces waging a civil war in two
countries. Doing so is in the interest of all humanity.
Jordan Haven

